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SURVEY OF TEXAS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1947
REAL PROPERTY
WIFE'S CONVEYANCES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY

N Magee v. Young,' the following question was presented:
What is the result of a deed executed by the husband and wife
covering non-homestead community property, where the husband's
name does not appear in the granting clause?
The Supreme Court treated the deed as inoperative as a conveyance, but as a valid contract for the sale of land. This doctrine that a defective deed may equal a good contract to convey
land is recognized by other jurisdictions,2 and the principle has
been adopted in Texas by statute!
In the case of Mondragon v. Mondragon' the owner of land
signed a receipt for $160 as payment for his interest in the land,
and it was held that such receipt should be treated as a valid contract to convey. In the principal case the husband in signing the
deed was held to have acknowledged receipt of the consideration
paid. The court reasoned that the principle of the Mondragon case
was applicable to the transaction here in question with respect to
the creation of a valid contract to convey and the passing of equitable title.
Since in the principal case, the court held that equitable title
1145

Tex. 485, 198 S. W. (2d) 883 (1947).
2 Swindall v. Ford, 184 Al. 137, 63 So. 651 (1913) ; Rushton v. Davis, 127 Ala. 279,
28 So. 476 (1900) ; See Naill v. Kirby, 162 Ark. 140, 257 S. W. 735, 739 (1924).
STax. Rav. Cv. STAT. (Vernon 1925) Art. 1301. "When an instrument in writing.
which was intended as a conveyance of real estate, or some interest therein, shall fail,
either in whole or in part, to take effect as a conveyance by virtue of the provisions of
this chapter, the same shall nevertheless be valid and effectual as a contract upon which

a conveyance may be enforced, as far as the rules of law will permit."
' 113 Tex. 404, 257 S. W. 215 (1923).
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passed under the deed operating as a land contract, it was not
deemed necessary to determine whether the transaction in question passed legal title. However on rehearing the doctrine was
expressly recognized that a deed to non-homestead community
property executed by the wife alone with the consent of the husband will vest legal title in the vendee.
This latter principle was recognized in the early case of Thomas
v. Chance' which first construed the Texas statute governing the
conveyance of community property. That statute provides strictly
that the community property "... may be disposed of by the husband only..

."'

However, the Thomas case in construing this lan-

guage stated:
".... although it may be the exclusive right of the husband, as the
acting partner, to control and dispose of the community property, yet

he may, expressly or by implication, invest his wife with all the authority possessed by himself over the community."'

This doctrine is well settled, and has been reaffirmed by later
decisions.'
The decisions are not uniform with respect to the question of
whether the husband's consent for the wife to convey non-homestead community property must be prior to the conveyance.'
' 11 Tex. 634 (1854).
STex. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon 1925) Art. 4619.
'11 Tex. 634, 637-638 (1854).
I Leyva v. Rodriquez, 195 S. W. (2d) 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) no reversible error;
Hanks v. Leslie, 159 S. W. 1056 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) error refd.; Couch v. Schwalbe,
51 Tcx. Civ. App. 04, 111 S. W. 1046 (1908) error refd.; Fox v. Brady, 1 Tex. Civ. App.
590, 20 S. W. 1024 (1892).
9 In Thomas v. Chance, 11 Tex. 634 (1854), there appears to have been actual consent at the time of the conveyance. There is however dictum in the case which states
that the authority may be given previously or subsequently to the act, either expressly
or by implication. Laster v. Jamison, 203 S. W. 1151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) error refd.,
is contra. The court there held that a conveyance by the wife of the community property
without the prior consent of the husband was a nullity, and therefore it could not be
ratified by subsequent acquiescence, but could be ratified only by an act having the
essential elements of a conveyance. In the case of Leyva v. Rodriquez, 195 S. W. (2d)
704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) no reversible error,the wife made a conveyance without the
prior consent of the husband. The husband subsequently ratified the act by affming his
signature to the deed. The court held that the conveyance was effective. This decision is
in accord with the dicta as before stated In the Thomas case.
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ADVERSE POSSESSION BY RIPARIAN OWNERS-WHAT IS THE
EFFECT OF A RECORDED OIL AND GAS LEASE UNDER

THE 10 YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS?

Heard v. State 0 was a suit in trespass to try title instituted by

the State and the town of Refugio against Mrs. Heard and the
Huston Oil Co., her oil lessee. The land in controversy was part
of a river bed. The river though navigable in law was not navigable in fact. By virtue of a statute"1 the State had relinquished
four-fifths of its interest in the river to the town of Refugio. The
defendants' claimed limitation title to the town's interest in the
river bed by virtue of ten years adverse possession.
The land in question was not separately fenced, but there were
fences separating the 600-acre Heard tract from the surrounding
land. There were fences on each side of the 600-acre tract crossing the stream with "water gaps." The fence on the west side
touched the disputed river bed. Mrs. Heard erected the fences,
above described, for the purpose of keeping the cattle upon her
land, and so that they might have access to the stream.
The defendant oil company, under a recorded oil and gas lease
on the entire 600-acre tract, including the land in question, had
installed a pipe line across the river, but had not drilled in the
river bed.1"
It was held, three justices dissenting, that Mrs. Heard in the
erection of the fences and the pasturing of her cattle upon the
land in question, was merely exercising her rights as a riparian
owner and was using the river bed as a convenience and a privilege, not under a claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to
the claim of the town; that the laying of the pipe lines by the oil
company would at most give them an easement against the town.
10 __ Tex. .....
204 S. W. (2d) 344 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1947).
11

TX.REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon 1925) Art. 5414a.
12 Itwas not shown whether the pipe line was operated under Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
(Vernon 1925) Art. 1497, or as a private line. This statute provides that an oil company
...shall have the right to lay its pipes and pipe lines across and under any... stream
in this state .... "
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The statutory requirements of adverse possession were not met by
the petitioners."8
To constitute adverse possession sufficient to vest title in the
adverse claimant, such possession must be continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period, and must be actual,* notorious,
distinct and hostile, and of such character as to indicate unmistakably an assertion of a claim of exclusive ownership in the
occupant."
As pointed out by the court the town could not have fenced off
the river bed without impairing the rights of the riparian owners;
and the riparian owners because of the nature of the river bed
and their adjoining land, could not have enclosed their cattle on
their lands and fully participated in their rights as riparian owners
without extending their fences across the river bed. It is clear
that the use and possession of the land in question by Mrs. Heard
was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the adverse possession statutes.
Not considered by the court are two recent decisions which
might have been applicable in the present case."' The courts in
these cases stated that to obtain title by limitation it was necessary
for the adverse possession to be of such a nature as would expose
the possessor to some liability for what was done by him or under
his authority during the limitation period. Under this doctrine
Mrs. Heard would not have obtained title by adverse possession,
because she incurred no liability through the prudent exercise of
her riparian rights.16
The dissent reasoned that the oil company's use of the land
is TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon 1925) Art. 5515, "'Adverse possession' is an actual
and visible appropriation of the land, commenced and continued under a claim of
right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of another."
14 Evans v. Templeton, 69 Tex. 375, 6 S. W. 843 (1887) ; Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61
Tex. 166 (1884).
15 Brownlee v. Landers, 166 S. W. (2d) 734 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) ; Niendorff v.
Wood, 140 S. W. (2d) 161 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error refd.
Is See Parker v. El Paso County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 116 Tex. 631, 642643, 297 S. W. 737, 742; Stacy v. Delery, 122 S. W. 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
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under its recorded lease was sufficient assertion of ownership to
notify the world of its adverse claim.
Assuming, as held by the majority, that the mere laying of pipe
lines in the present case was not sufficient to constitute adverse
possession, the question is then presented: what is the effect of a
recorded instrument covering the land in question when the possession and use is insufficient to constitute adverse possession?
The mere record of a deed is not of itself possession, and in
fact is not notice of an adverse claim. 7 It is actual possession of
the land that gives notice of the adverse claim.'" In Holland vi
Nance," the court states that when the adverse claimant has actual
possession of the land, and has a deed for it upon record, the
record is notice as to the character and extent of his claim. Assuming that the defendant oil company in the present case had sufficient possession" to refer the owner to the recorded instrument,
what is the character of his claim?
The usual oil and gas lease conveys to the oil and gas lessee a
determinable fee in the mineral estate"' and an easement in the
Holland v. Nance, 102 Tex. 177, 114 S. W. 346 (1908).
8 .SeeMcKee v. Stewart, 139 Tex. 260, 270; 162 S. W. (2d) 948, 953 (1942). See also
Rosborough v. Cook, 108 Tex. 364, 366; 194 S. W. 131, 132 (1917) in which the Court
stated: "The law of limitation of actions for land is founded upon notice. The title by
limitation ripens primarily, only because, in such manner and for such period of time
as the different statutes require, notice is given of the hostile claim. Under the three
years statute, it is afforded by possession under title or color of tide. Under the ten year
statute, simply by possession. And under the five years statute, it is given by possession,
the payment of taxes, and the registration of a naked deed."
10 102 Tex. 177, 114 S.W. 346 (1908).
20 Tn Hill v. Harris, 26 S.W. 823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901), the question of sufficiency of
possession to send the true owner to the record to ascertain the extent of the claim was
presented. The court was of the opinion that the record of a deed is not notice to the
true owner until some act is upon the land amounting to adverse possession. It has been
stated that under the ten year statute the fact that the occupier claims under a deed, or
other muniment of title, does not effect the operation of the law in relation to notice,
except in cases where more than 160 acres of land is involved. See Neal v. Pickett, 280
S. W. 748, 752 (Com. App. 1926); See Rosborough v. Cook, 108 Tex. 364, 366, 194 S. W.
131, 132 (1917).
2 31A TEx.Ju. 208 1127 (1947) ; Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509,186 S. W. (2d)
961 (1945) ; Normandie Oil Corporation v. Oil Trading Co., 139 Tex. 402, 163 S. W. (2d)
179 (1942).
17
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surface estate for the purpose of the mineral grant.2 2 The lessor
retains ownership in the surface23 subject to the lessee's mineral
easement.2 In view of the foregoing, it would seem that a recorded
oil and gas lease would define the character and extent of the
lessee's claim as merely an easement, and would not purport to
grant any other claim in the surface.
UNMARRIED DAUGHTER'S RIGHT TO HOMESTEAD

In Carson v. McFarland25 the parties to the suit entered into a
stipulation whereby it was agreed that if the court found that the
plaintiff, an unmarried daughter, was remaining with her deceased
father as a constituent member of his family at the time of his
death, then all property described in the plaintiff's petition was
exempt from forced sale under the Constitution an(d laws of this
state.
After the death of her mother in 1939 the plaintiff visited a
sister in another city. Thereafter she entered a business college in
a city other than the city of the family residence. From 1941 to
1943 the plaintiff was employed outside of the state. It is not
clear whether she returned to the family residence after leaving
in 1939.
The trial court found that at the time of the death of her
father
in 1942, she was a constituent member of his family. The controlling reason for the trial court's holding seems to be the fact
that the plaintiff did not intend ". . . . to establish any residence
other than that of the family residence. ."" The present court
was of the opinion that the facts supported the holding of the trial
court and affirmed its judgment. The conclusion of the court was
22 31.A TEX. Jun. 208 § 127 (1947).
23 31-A TEX. Jun. 191 § 118 (1947) ; Greer v. Caldwell-Guadalipe Pick-Up Sgahions,
286 S. W. 1083 (Com. App. 1926).
24 31-A TEx. Jun. 191 §118 (1947).
25 206 S. W. (2d) 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
!6206 S. W. (2d) 130, 131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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based upon the principle that our exemption laws are to be lib.
erally construed in favor of the claimant.2 7
The rights of survivors to exemptions in Texas are governed
by statute. The statute in which we are here concerned provides
that the court shall
".. . set apart for the use and benefit of widow and minor children
and unmarried daughter remaining wiih the /antily of the deceased,

all such property of the estate as may lie exempt from execution or

forced sale by the constitution and lairs of the State .... ,,28
An earlier case stated that the test for determining whether the
homestead exemption of property continues after the death of the
owner is whether such owner left surviving a husband or wife,
a minor child, or unmarried daughter residing with the family. 29
From the facts it is clear that the plaintiff's domicile continued
at the family homestead.3" It would appear, however, that the
plaintiff definitely established a residence outside of the state.
Domicile and residence are not synonymous, as residence means
living in a particular location and simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile means living in
"T"From the early days of the Republic to the present time Texas has been the refuge
of the unfortunate of other countries. Iler very existence as a government was conceived
in her colonization laws. 11er homestead and exemption laws, founded in wisdom and
liberality, have ever been jealously guarded by her statesmen and jurists; and to this,
doubtless, as much as to any otlier cause, we are indebted for our rapidly-increasing population and the development of our industrial resources." Black v. Rockmore, 50 Tex. 88,
96 (1878) ; Cullers v. James, 66 Tex. 494, 1 S. W. 314 (1886) ; See Reconstruction
Finance Corp. v. Burgess, 155 S. W. (2d) 977, 980, error ref'd; Clark v. Vitz, 190 S. W.
(2d) 736 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
I's TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon's 1925) Art. 3485.
"9See Kay v. Thompson, 40 S. W. (2d) 884, 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), affirmed in
124 Tex. 252, 77 S. W. (2d) 201 (1934). "The unmarried daughters to whom exemption
rights survive are only such as are residing with the family of the deceased at the time
of his death...." Nu N-, TEXAS HOMESTEAD, 235, 236 (1931). Reconstruction Finance
Corporation v. Burgess, 155 S. W. (2d) 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), error refd.
30 One acquiring a domicile does not lose it without removal from it with intent not
to return. Graves v. Campbell, 74 Tex. 576, 12 S. W. 238 (1889). The domicile remains
unaffected by a temporary residence abroad, and is not changed until a new one is formed
by settlement in a new place with the intention of there remaining for an indefinite time.
Stone v. Phillips, 142 Tex. 216, 176 S. W. (2d) 932 (1944).
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such locality with intent to make it a fixed and permanent home."32
It is generally said that a person may have several residences,
although he can have but one domicile."3
Assuming the plaintiff was a resident at the family homestead
at the time of her father's death, it would seem that the statutory
mandate of remaining"' with the family would require that she be
living with her father at that time in order to be eligible for the
exemption." However, it would appear that the case at hand considered an unmarried daughter domiciled at the family homestead
to be "remaining with the family."
PRESUMPTION OF INTENT TO CONVEY TO CENTER OF HIGHWAY

The question presented in Goldsmith v. Humble Oil & Refining

Co."6 was whether a deed conveyed a small tract of land not therein
described. The Supreme Court in reversing the Court of Civil
Appeals" answered in the negative. The basis of the decision was
the fact that upon the land in controversy there was not an existing road, passageway or alley in which an easement had been created or acquired when the deed was executed.
It is a well established rule in Texas that when a conveyance
31 Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Thompsn, 106 Tex. 456. 167 S. W. 801 (1914); Major v.
Loy, 155 S. W. (2d) 617, 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) ; 1 BEALE, CoNruicr OF LAws, § 10.3
(1935).
3"Pittsburg Water Heater Co. v. Sullivan, 115 Tex. 417, 282 S. W. 576 (1926) ; Brown
v. Boulden, 18 Tex. 432 (1857).
3 Cross v. Everts, 28 Tex. 524 (1866) ; Johnson v. State, 267 S. W. 1057, 1058 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1925), error ref d.
34 The Texas Supreme Court has approved the Webster International Dictionary
definition of the word remain: "...to
continue unchanged in place ...... Tinkle v.
Sweeney, 97 Tex. 190, 192, 77 S. W. 609, 610 (1903).
3 "... A daughter who is separated frnm her husband and who is living with the
family of the deceased does not come within the meaning of the word "unmarried," although she comes within the term "residing with the family." But a daughter, whose
husband is dead, or a daughter, who has been divorced from her husband, if she be living
with the amily of the deceased at the time of his death, takes the exemption." NUNN,
TEXAS HOMESTEAD, 336 (1931). In contrast to note 27, supra, it has been stated that:
".. . the doctrine of the homestead claim may have been stretched, yea to the breaking
point..." See Tiblier v. Perez, 277 S. W. 189, 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
3o _ Tex. __, 199 S.W. (2d) 773 (1947).
37 196 S. W. (2d) 665 (Tex Civ. App. 1946).
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is made of a lot or a tract of land abutting upon a street or high.
way, the fee in which belongs to the owner of the abutting land,
a presumption is indulged that the grantor intended to convey
the fee to the center of the street or highway unless a contrary
intention is shown."8
The court was of the opinion that the facts of the principal case
did not justify the utilization of the presumption. There are two
distinct differences between the facts of the present case and the
facts of the cases cited in support of the rule. The first difference
is that in the present case there was no reference to a road or
passageway; whereas in the cases cited in support of the rule the
deed expressly referred to a road or passageway by which the tract
conveyed was bounded. The second distinction is that in the principal case upon the land in dispute there was not an existing road
or passageway in which an easement had been created or acquired
at the time of the conveyance; whereas in the cases cited in support of the rule the tract conveyed was bounded by a road or
passageway in which an easement existed at the time the deed
was executed.
The first distinction, above mentioned, would not appear to be
controlling. If the land described by metes and bounds is actually
bounded by a highway, the fact that the highway is not mentioned
as a boundary in the deed does not of itself indicate an intention
that the grantee shall not obtain title to the center of the highway."' However, to justify the application of the presumption, the
court was of the opinion that the existence of a road or passage88 Cox v. Campbell, 135 Tex. 428, 143 S. W. (2d) 361 (1940); Cantley v. Gulf
Production Co., 135 Tex. 339, 143 S. W. (2d) 912 (1940) ; Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Weed,
121 Tex. 427, 50 S. W. (2d) 1080 (1932). This rule is well established. See Anderson v.
Citizens Savings &Trust Co., 185 Cal. 386, 197 Pac. 113 (1921) ; Hensley v. Lewis, 278
Ky. 510, 128 S. W. (2d) 917 (1939) ; Suburban Land Co. v. Town of Billerecie, 314
Mass. 184. 49 N. E. (2d) 1012 (1943) ; Talbot v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 177
Va. 443, 14 S. E. (2d) 335 (1941).
39 Merchant v. Grant, 26 Cal. App. 485, 147 Pac. 484 (1915) ; City of Springfield
ez re. Koch v. Eisenmayer, 297 S. W. 460 (1927) ; Cross v. Talbot, 121 Or. 270,254 Pac.
827 (1927) ; Durbin v. Roonoke Bldg. Co., 107 Va. 7S3,60 S. E. 86 (1908).
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way in which an easement has been acquired at the time of the
conveyance is essential.'"
In Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Weed, the Supreme Court of Texas in
applying the rule gave as the reason for the presumption of intention to convey to the center of the road or passageway:
"... the fact that valuable rights and privileges appurtenant to property should be presumed to pass in a conveyance thereof in the absence
of a clear and unequivocal intention to the contrary."41

The court in that case treats the title to land in the road or
passageway burdened with the easement, as an appurtenant right
or an incident to the adjoining land, a right or incident of peculiar
advantage and value to the owner of the land, which ordinarily
passes by a conveyance thereof as essential to its proper enjoyment. In view of the foregoing, the reason for the presumption is
not present, and in the absence of such reason the court held that
there was no justification for any imputation of intention on the
part of the grantor.' 2
40 Raleigh-Hayward Co. v. Hull, 167 Wash. 39, 8 P. (2d) 988, 991 (1932), held that
by formal vacation of a street the land embraced therein was freed from the public easement and did not pass as an incident or appurtenance to lots thereafter conveyed which
bordered on the vacated street. "When the easement ceases, there is no occasion nor

justification for any imputation of intention." ELLIOTT ON ROADS AND Se nrs, 111192

(4th ed. 1926). But cf. Anderson v. Citizens Savings &Trust Co., 185 Cal. 386, 197 Pac.
113 (1921). The court in recognizing the presumption treated the street as a monument.
The presumption was applied in the absence of an easement. Reference in the deed was
made to a map which showed the lot to be bounded by a street. The street, although it
was not indicated in the map, had been abandoned by the public. Held, that a street was
created between the grantor and the grantee, regardless of whether or not there is an
existing dedication as between the grantor and the public. The court implied that the
rule might not apply where the street is described as abandoned.
41121 Tex. 427, 440, 50 S.W. (2d) 1080, 1085 (1932). The reasons given for the
application of the rule are varied. Some of the reasons advanced by various jurisdictions
are: That it is in accord with public policy to prevent disputes and litigation over narrow
strips or gores of land, Bowers v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 119 Kans. 202, 237 Pac. 913
(1925) ; that the highway is a monument and the boundary line goes through the center
of the monument, Helmer v. Castle, 109 111. 664 (1884) ; that the small strip is of little
value to the grantor but of great value to the grantee, Mott v. Mott, 68 N. Y. 246 (1877) ;
that retention of such a narrow strip of land would retard the improvement and further
alienation of the adjoining property, MacCorkle v. City of Charleston, 105 W. Va. 394,
142 S.E. 841 (1928).
10 The Court of Civil Appeals found an intention on the part of the grantor to dedicate the land in question to the public as a passageway or alley from recitals in two

REAL PROPERTY
BREACH OF WARRANTY-NECESSITY

OF EVICTION

In Schneider v. Lipscomb County National Farm Loan Association," X conveyed certain land to Y with a covenant of general
warranty. The Commissioner of the General Land Office, after
determining that a portion of the land conveyed was unsurveyed
public land, awarded the same to Z. Y remained in possession of
the land and brought suit against Z, without joining X his warrantor, to contest the validity of the Commissioner's award. The
Commissioner's award to Z was sustained. A short time after the
judgment but more than four years after the award to Z, Y brought
the present action against X on the warranty. The question presented is whether the four-year statute of limitations has barred
Y's action on the warranty. The Supreme Court held that the action
on the warranty was not barred by limitations, because the award
by the Land Commissioner was not an authoritative assertion by
the state of paramount title. It was further pointed out by the
court that even if the award were considered as an authoritative
assertion of superior title by the state, there was no eviction,
because Y did not yield to the award.
The nature and purpose of a general warranty is to indemnify
the purchaser against the loss or injury he may sustain because
of a failure or defect in the vendor's title."" To constitute a breach
of warranty there must be a failure of title, either entirely or in
part." A mere cloud upon the title is insufficient.' In addition to
failure of title there must be an eviction.'" The earlier decisions
required an actual eviction before the suit could be maintained,
but under the modem rule the suit can be commenced after condeeds executed several years later and from other subsequent events. The Supreme Court
however, stated that the intent of the parties must be determined at the time of the execution of the deed and not from subsequent acts or declarations. See Paine v. Consumer's
Forwarding &Storage Co., 71 Fed. 626, 631 (1895).
43 __ Tex. __ 202 S. W. (2d) 832 (1947).
4' See Samuel Y. McClelland, Adm'r. v. John L. Moore, 48 Tex. 355, 363 (1877).

45 12 Tax. Jun 40 (1931).
48 See Freeman v. Anderson, 119 S. W. (2d) 1081, 1083 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
47 Graener et al. v. Limburger's Ex'rs., 293 S. W. 1100 (Com. App. 1927).
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structive eviction or ouster in pais, as exemplified by those
instances where paramount title has been asserted against the
covenantee and he has yielded to the adverse claim, by surrendering possession or by purchasing the superior title. s
It is generally said that a constructive eviction occurs when the
facts are such that it would be useless for the covenantee to attempt
to retain the title conveyed to him."9
Is a yielding necessary to constitute an eviction where the state
has asserted superior title to the land warranted? The majority
of the court answered in the affirmative. The dissenting opinion
reasoned that an assertion by the state of superior title was of
itself constructive eviction, and that in such cases there is no necessity of a yielding by the covenantee.
A sale of land by the government may be the equivalent of an
eviction,"0 and it has been held when title to land is in the public
an attempted conveyance is tantamount to an eviction the instant
the deed is made."
The civil appeals case of Shannon v. Childers5" is in accord with
the dissent. In that case it was held that the action of the state
through its legally constituted authorities, in forfeiting the survey, in legal contemplation amounted to a constructive eviction
of the warrantee. There was no finding as to an actual disseizin.
The court in the principal case in commenting on the Shannon
case disapproved of the principle as therein stated, but stated that
the judgment rendered was correct, because there was a constructive eviction when the covenantee acquiesced in the result of the
re-survey and yielded to the paramunt title asserted by the owners
of the prior surveys.
The reason for requiring a yielding in breach of warranty cases
48 See Rancho Bonito Land & Live-Stock Co. v. North, 92 Tex. 72, 75, 45 S. W. 994,
996 (1898).
49 See Whitaker v. Felts, 137 Tex. 578, 580, 155 S. W. (2d) 604, 605.606 (1941).
50 Green v. Irwin, 54 Miss. 450 (1877).
51 Cover v. McAden, 183 N. C. 641, 112 S. E. 817 (1922) ; Beecher v. Tinnin, 26 N. M.
59, 189 Pac. 44 (1920).
52 202 S. W. 1030 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918), error refd.
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is that a continued possession by the warrantee could ripen into
title by adverse possession." s The dissent reasons that as the warrantee cannot obtain adverse possession against the state, there
is no necessity for a yielding in such cases."
Individuals ordinarily cannot obtain title to state lands by
adverse possession, 5 but here the situation is different. The state's
assertion of title to public lands is usually made by an award or
sale of the same. A purchaser from the state, before the issuance
of a patent, has sufficient title through the sale or award to maintain an action in trespass to try title, and this title is subject to
divestment by adverse possession, even though the state cannot
be barred. 6 It would seem from the foregoing that the court correctly held that the usual rules of eviction should apply to the
present case. The reason for requiring a yielding in the ordinary
case would appear to prevail in the present case.
In the usual case if the warrantee does not yield to the opposing claim, but remains on the land and obtains title by adverse
possession the same will inure to the benefit of the warrantor, and
in such case the warrantee will not have a cause of action for
breach of warranty. 7 If the award of the Land Commissioner is
considered as a constructive eviction of the warrantee he would
have an immediate cause of action for breach of warranty. He
could thereafter remain in possession and obtain title by adverse
possession. It would seem that in any case where this result is
possible the better rule would require a yielding on the part of
the warrantee, before his cause of action on the warranty accrues.
I. .K.

Mcregor v. Tabor, 26 S. W. 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
Staub v. Tripp, 248 Mich. 45,226 N. W. 667 (1929).
s5 TLx. Rcv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon's 1925) Art. 5517.
586Whitaker v. McCarty, 221 S. W. 945 (Com. App. 1920).
5? McGregor v. Tabor, 26 S. W. 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
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